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The threat of Stuart restoration during the Jacobite rebellions in the ﬁrst half of the
eighteenth century did not only cause a dynastic crisis, but also resulted ﬁnancial caos
in London. This panic manifested itself in regular runs on the Bank of England of
‘alarming dimensions’.1 The Bank’s customers took their convertible deposit notes to
the Bank in order to convert them to gold specie. As the Bank was in danger of running
out of gold, it employed a delay strategy to slow down the gold ﬂow. The Bank paid
out specie in tiny six-pence pieces, which took so long to count that time was gained
for the panic to ease and gold demand to reduce to the normal level. The method of
paying gold in small pieces placed, in practice, an adjustment cost on gold purchases.
This example raises the question of why the Bank of England, the most powerful
monetary institution of the country, was forced to use such an unconventional method
to secure its gold reserves. The answer lies both on the importance of the gold convert-
ibility rule, which had become the essential part of the monetary policy, and on those
diﬃculties the Bank had to deal with in order to maintain the rule. The eighteenth
century was an era of constant wars and domestic political disturbances, and demand
for gold was at its highest during the time of crisis. As both historical and theoretical
analysis shows, it was not the automatic operations of the gold standard rule, but rather
these unconventional practices that evolved over the time, which had a crucial role in
implementing the monetary policy.
Emergence of the gold convertibility as a core monetary policy rule was neither
an accident nor a plan, but an outcome of institutional development. According to
Fetter (1965) the Bank of England was not established in 1694 to perform central
banking functions any more than the goldsmiths.2 Together with the Royal Mint the
Bank of England controlled minting of silver and gold specie, but was not able to
regulate printing of paper money or various forms of credit currency. Already by the
beginning of the eighteenth century paper forms of money — private banks’ notes and
1Acres (1931) Vol I, p 107.
2Fetter (1965) p. 23.
2bills of exchanges — exceeded specie money.3 Despite its lack of control the Bank of
England was able to maintain the gold convertibility of the pound with fairly low bullion
levels even during wars and domestic crises, which could have potentially caused heavy
external drains.
Apart from the gold convertibility rule the eighteenth century was an era when there
was no generally accepted theory or practice of money or banking in place.4 Monetary
and ﬁscal institutions such as Bank of England, Royal Mint and Treasury existed, but
their policies were often inconsistent and the laws concerning these institutions or their
activities were inadequate and contradictory. Nevertheless, the main principle of a
commodity standard, the obligation of the monetary authority to sell gold at the ﬁxed
money price, was ﬁrmly in place: England had been on the commodity money system
from medieval times and on de facto gold standard from 1717 onwards, when Isaac
Newton, the Master of the Royal Mint, ﬁxed the parity between gold and silver so that
silver was slightly over valued in relation to gold.
Monetary policy during the Pre-classical Gold Standard, which prevailed in England
from 1717 to 1797, has not been analysed theoretically before. Although the heyday
of the Classical Gold Standard lasted only for 35 years, between 1880 and 1914, it
has received much more attention. Being a period of relative domestic stability and
peace the era of the Classical Gold Standard presents a stark contrast to the turmoil of
the eighteenth century. The gold standard functioned as an international rule: North
America, Germany and France, the main trade partners of Great Britain, participated
in the gold standard system, and even the smaller European nations were joining in.
The business of printing paper money was now a strict monopoly of the Central Bank,
and in absence of the usury laws, which set the maximum legal rate of interest at ﬁve
percent, the gold stock of the central bank could have been protected indirectly through
interest rate policy.
Bordo and Kydland (1995) argue that the gold standard was intended as a contin-
gent rule: during a war or other emergency the government could challenge the rule by
3Davies (1776) p.278.
4This is a one of the main themes in Fetter (1965).
3temporarily suspending the commodity standard on the understanding that the con-
vertibility would be restored at the original parity after the emergency had passed.5
The convertibility in the eighteenth century was not, however, suspended until 1797,
thus England fought three wars6 staying on the gold standard. In this paper I argue
that the gold standard in the eighteenth century functioned as a contingent rule, but in
a diﬀerent manner than during the Classical Gold Standard. The Bank did not suspend
the cash payments; instead it imposed an adjustment cost to notes-to-gold conversion
in order to reduce the outﬂow of gold. Through the lens of a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium model I analyse the eﬀects of the adjustment cost, which were not
limited solely to the gold reserve policy, but had an eﬀect on the economy as whole by
stabilising the gold demand, consumption and the price level.
This paper is arranged as follows: Section two analyses the Bank of England’s ability
to control the money supply and its gold reserves, and the institutional development
of which outcome was the emergence of the gold convertibility as the most important
monetary policy rule. Section three explains in detail how the Bank was able to use the
adjustment cost strategy in conducting monetary policy during the eighteenth century.
Section four analyses wider implications of this adjustment cost in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium framework. Section ﬁve summarises the results.
2 The Gold Convertibility Rule and Central Bank-
ing in the Eighteenth Century
2.1 Emergence of the Gold Convertibility as a Core Monetary
Policy Rule
The establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 as a private joint stock bank that
was in charge of public ﬁnance, was the most successful out of the hundreds of ﬁnancial
5Bordo and Kydland (1995).
6The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), The Seven Years’ War (1756—1763) and the
American War of Independence (1775—1783). The French Revolutionary Wars started at 1793.
4experiments of the late seventeenth century. The Bank was born, ‘out of the marriage
of convenience’ between the business community of the City and the government of the
day:7 the merchants were motivated by proﬁt opportunities and the government needed
cash to pay its war expenditures. Establishment of a credit institution, which was under
direct control of Parliament, gradually ended the dominance of the goldsmiths over the
credit market, whose business practices had largely been unregulated.8 Parliament’s
priority was to ﬁnd ways to limit the power of the King and government over the Bank
in lending. The Bank had to instantly stop payment ‘if it had ceased to receive the
interest on the sum which it had advanced to the government’9 and the Bank was not
allowed to lend to the government without the explicit consent of Parliament.
Another novel aspect on its operations was that the Bank of England managed its
own specie and bullion reserves, which enabled it to issue notes payable on demand.10
This had been impossible for previous monarchs, who had no reserves of any kind; for
example Charles II’s orders were payable only with eighteen months delay.11 Although
the ﬁrst balance sheet of the Bank shows that its gold reserves were low compared to its
liabilities and its assets mainly consisted of government paper, the merchants accepted
the notes at par in payments very soon after its establishment. The conﬁdence of
merchants was the most important determinant of the Bank’s strength.12
The Bank of England was not the ﬁrst public institution, which had issued ﬁduciary
currency, but the ﬁrst one to be able to issue it in a sustainable manner and learn from
its own mistakes. The ﬁrst lesson in the management of public ﬁnance and convert-
ibility came already in 1696. Charles II had started to issue tallies, wooden sticks that
had previously been used as evidence of tax payments, to persons who made either
advances or gave supplies to the king, promising to redeem them later with interest.13
Tallies were issued to such an extent that even thought the interest rate on them was
7Davies (1776) p. 256.
8Vilar (1976) p. 213.
9North and Weingast (1989) p. 821.
10Feavearyear (1963) p. 127.
11Feavearyear (1963) pp. 126-127.
12Vilar (1976) p. 281.
13Feavearyear (1963) p. 110.
5increased, no more could be placed. At the date of the Bank’s foundation the value of
tallies outstanding was around £5,000,000 and they were accepted in the City only at a
considerable discount of 25 or 30 percent.14 The Bank, however, in addition to deposits
and interest bearing notes, had a right to raise working capital through discounting the
bills of exchange, which tallies practically were. The acceptance of tallies at the Bank
had two immediate eﬀects: the value of these wooden sticks rose to par, and satisﬁed
government was again able to issue them, using the income to pay the suppliers of the
army.
The tallies resulted in a credit expansion accompanied by a fever of gambling in the
stock market, increased gold and silver prices and depreciated the currency. The price
of silver and commodities increased about 25 percent but the price of gold and the gold
guineas went up about 40 percent. The circulating coins became badly clipped: during
the recoinage between 1695 and 1696 £4,700,000 worth of clipped coins brought to the
Royal Mint contained only £2,700,000 worth of silver.15
After the ﬁrst credit expansion the special position of the Bank of England, as a
banker to government and as a London note issuer, was gradually recognised. The
purpose of the Bank was not to absorb as much government debt as possible, as this
would not have been a sustainable strategy — the Bank’s purpose was to make the
government debt an attractive investment option. In order to attract the public to buy
government paper, the value of money had to stay stable and the public’s conﬁdence
towards the monetary system strong. Maintaining gold convertibility became the main
way to gain trust and stability. The long term national debt was not created by the
Bank of England’s direct purchases, but through the issue of bills and bonds which were
traded on the London Stock Exchange. At the same time that the national debt was
born, paper money came into existence, as people gradually realised that the money
could take other forms than just specie with intrinsic value.
14Feavearyear (1963) p.127.
15Feavearyear (1963) p. 141.
62.2 Control of the Bank of England over the Money Supply
The supply of Bank of England notes alone could not satisfy the demand for capital
during the Industrial Revolution. The growth of the country banks, especially after
1750, increased regional money supply. The English banking system developed as a
three layered pyramid as seen in Figure 1, consisting of the Bank of England, the
rest of the London private banks and the country banks.16 By the second half of the
eighteenth century the Bank of England notes had become the main currency used
in large payments in London. London private banks gradually ceased to issue notes
because they could not compete with the interest rate the Bank of England paid.17
Bank of England notes rarely circulated outside the London area where the country
bank notes were the main medium of exchange. The systemresembled the gold exchange
standard of the twentieth century: the private bank notes were convertible to the Bank
of England notes, which in turn were convertible to gold on demand. As seen in Figure









Figure 1: Credit Pyrdamid in the Eighteenth Century
Many of the London bankers kept their reserves in the Bank notes or towards the
































Figure 2: The Circulation of the Bank of England Notes and Bullion Reserves, annually
1720-1797. Clapham (1944) , Appendix C, pp. 295-296.
end of the eighteenth century, kept accounts in the Bank. They had, therefore, direct
access to the Bank of England’s notes and bullion. The London private banks integrated
small country bank units by supplying links between country banks in agricultural areas,
which had excess capital for lending and the industrial areas, which had excess demand
for capital.
The passing of the Bubble act in 1708 limited the maximum partners of banks
in England and Wales to six and gave the Bank of England a monopoly in joint stock
banking. The capital of any other bank was therefore limited to what could be provided
by up to 6 partners, which meant that English banks were severely undercapitalised.18
The number of the country banks grew hand in hand with the Industrial Revolution.
The growth was, however, uneven, as it was phenomenal for the country banks that
their numbers would have been brought down by a crisis and the note circulation down
by third or by half, but one or two years after each crisis both their number and note
issue was again greater than ever. In 1750 there were twelve country banks outside
18Dowd (1989) p. 118 .
8London but in 1793, there were nearly 400.19 The number of London private banks
almost doubled in the second half of the eighteenth century. Data on the circulation
of country bank notes is not available until 1804 and onwards when the law required
stamp duties to be paid on private notes. The value of all notes stamped in 1805 was
£10,700,000 thus the private bank notes consisted of almost 40 percent of the total
paper money in circulation.20
The Bank of England’s control over the country banks was not obvious as they did
not keep substantial amounts of reserve in the Bank notes or gold, but in deposits with
London private banks.21 Therefore, the main inﬂuence of the Bank over the country
banks was through the London money market. According to Pressnell (1956) to some
extent the Bank functioned as a lender of a last resort: ‘when money was scarce country
banks in general turned to London much as London ﬁrms turned to the Bank of England
as the lender of last resort’.22 If there was small urgent need for money, the coin was
still the only form of money available as small notes were illegal in England and Wales.
The country banks then drew down their gold deposits from London and London banks
drew cash from their accounts with the Bank.
It was widely believed at the time that the instability of English banks was not
due to their undercapitalisation and money supply, but to their freedom to set their
own terms of redemption and issue small notes.23 As silver and small coins were rare,
notes with face value of six pence became acceptable. Therefore, controlling the value
of the money through limiting the money supply stayed in the back ground. In 1775
Parliament forbade English banks from issuing notes of less than £1 in order to protect
the public, especially illiterate poor people, who commonly used the small notes. Two
years later Parliament passed further laws reducing the negotiability of paper money
and specifying some security measures, such as signatures and dates, on notes.
Until the Suspension Period there were no organised discussion about the relation
19eavearyear, Clapham and Pressnell all accept the view that i
20Pressnell (1956) p. 188.
21Pressnell (1956) p.76.
22Pressnell (1956) p. 76.
23Dowd (1989) p. 118.
9of the credit of the private banks to the total money supply or of the potential problems
resulting from the fast growth of the country banks. The banking problems stayed in
the background of the political agenda as more acute questions such as parliamentary
reform, the American War of Independence and the French Revolution dominated the
discussion.24 It is possible that the country banks’ credit issue did not bother decision
makers because it did not create major inﬂation. Between 1790 and 1793 the canal
mania had increased the credit demand for investments, which were slow to yield return.
The outbreak of the French Revolutionary war in 1793 was followed by deep ﬁnancial
crisis in England, but the war really just accelerated the crisis, which was the result of
the situation before the war, namely the credit structure of the private banks.25 The
Bank of England, sometimes with the help of the Treasury, was able to maintain the
gold convertibility four further years, but in February 1797 the Bank ceased the gold
payments altogther to protect its reserves and maintain its notes in circulation.
3 Strategies to Secure Convertibility during the Pre-
classical Gold Standard
3.1 Arbitrage Proﬁts
Any kind of commodity standard has to deal with the dilemma of arbitrage proﬁts,
which arises when the market price of the commodity backing the currency increases
above the mint or monetary price, the price the individual has to pay to purchase the
commodity from the central bank. For example, if the monetary price of gold were
below the market price, gold could be purchased from the central bank and sold at a
higher price in the private market. The arbitrage proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the
monetary and the market price of gold.
The theory of the Classical Gold Standard rules out these arbitrage proﬁt oppor-
tunities by the automatic price adjustment mechanism. The circulating money stock
24Fetter (1965) p. 11.
25Pressnell (1956) p. 457.
10has to decrease when people buy gold from the central bank and as a result the market
price level of all commodities, including gold, falls until the original rise in the market
price of gold is matched. The arbitrage automatically keeps the market price of gold
equal to the mint price of gold. Under the international gold standard, disturbances in
the price level in one country were wholly oﬀset by an automatic balance-of-payments
adjustment mechanism, which involved shipping of gold from one country to another.
This and other automatic operations of the gold standard have been the focus of much
economic research.26
The price adjustment mechanism, however, did not work to the same extent dur-
ing the Pre-classical Gold Standard as the gold standard did not yet operate as an
international rule. Regular wars and revolutions in European countries caused political
disturbances and commercial distress such as trade blockades. The law, which made
the export of British bullion and specie abroad illegal, was supposed to prevent the ﬂow
of gold from Britain. But as the law was diﬃcult to implement, it did not have much
eﬀect. According to Fetter (1965) there was a general acceptance by the bankers and
merchants of London of the idea that in practice British monetary gold was withdrawn
from the Bank and smuggled to the continent when the exchanges were unfavorable and
the price of gold abroad was higher than at home.27 Disruptions in gold supply and
shipping conditions, especially during warfare on the sea, made the gold convertibility
rule a challenging task to follow. Bank runs and ﬁnancial panics were relatively com-
mon and demand for gold was at its highest during political disruption. If there were
simultaneous gold supply blockades, the Bank of England was in danger of exhausting
its gold reserves.
Another motivation for the Bank of England to restrict the outﬂow of monetary
gold was to avoid the Bank making a loss on gold trade. Between 1774 and 1797 the
average price of standard gold bullion had been £3. 17s. 73
4d.28 As the mint price of
gold was £3. 17s. 101
2d., the average market price was just 0.003 percent below the
mint price. If the market price of gold was high and the Bank was forced to buy gold,
26Some of the most recent studies include Barro (1979) and Goodfriend (1988).
27Fetter (1965) pp. 4-6.
28Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 8.
11it made a loss, as gold had to be sold out at a ﬁxed price. The Bank was an active gold
trader and it employed its own gold dealers.29 As the Bank had to exchange gold for
its notes, buying gold did not increase the gold backing rate signiﬁcantly, but helped
to satisfy the gold demand in the short run.
3.2 Methods to Reduce Outﬂow of Monetary Gold
When monetary gold was withdrawn faster than it came in, the Bank of England had
a number of strategies it used to reduce the outﬂow of the gold. For example the Bank
oﬀered to change its ordinary deposit notes to interest bearing notes or some other form
of paper currency. In May 1696 the Governor of the Bank announced that government
tallies would be given to any person ‘under any uneasiness for want of his mony’30
and people were invited to exchange their notes to sealed bills, which bore interest.31
The same strategy was used again during the crisis following the South Sea Bubble in
1721.32 As the lack of, and therefore the demand for, small change was chronic at the
eighteenth century, the Bank persuaded the public to convert their large notes to the
same amount of new notes which had smaller face value.
Various delay strategies were common too. In 1696 the Bank committed to pay all
notes of £5 and under in full only alphabetically:
beginning upon Wednesday the 28th day of October instant with Notes
payable to names of A and B, and so on Wednesday of every week two letters
through the alphabet.33
Another delay strategy was to pay demands for cash in shillings and six-pences.
The process of counting the small gold coin caused considerable delay, and time was
thereby gained during the worst periods of the crises.
29Clapham (1944), Vol I, p.132.
30Acres (1931) Vol I, p. 70.
31Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 42.
32Acres (1931) p. 117.
33Acres (1931) pp. 73-74, as quoted in London Gazette, 26 November 1696.
12The Bank adopted the delay strategy from the goldsmiths who had monopolised
the banking business until the establishment of the Bank of England in 169434. Even
at the end of the eighteenth century only relatively wealthy individuals had accounts
at the Bank, and ordinary people, the most likely to rush to save their small savings,
deposited their valuables with the goldsmiths. The goldsmiths, who had to face the ﬁrst
wave of the cash runs, began to delay payments during the panic caused by the second
Anglo-Dutch war in 1667, when the Dutch ﬂeet was in the Thames and threatened
to attack London. They and some other City business men considered the Bank of
England as their competitor.35 The leading goldsmiths remained hostile towards the
Bank and could demand ‘immediate payment in cash at a time when the knew the
Bank was embarrassed’.36
Bank runs usually followed domestic disturbances such as the South Sea Bubble in
172137 and the Battle of Prestonpans in 1745 during the Jacobite Rebellion.38 Often
it was only a general feeling of uneasiness that made people prefer cash to notes. For
example the serious illness of Queen Anne in 1713, her death in 1714 and uncertainty
about her successor caused runs on the Bank39. Panics were sometimes groundless, and
it seems that it was diﬃcult to forecast which event actually provoked a bank run. For
example Clapham mentions that during the Seven Years’ War (1759-63) there was no
acute banking pressure and the war years were a time of relative domestic prosperity.40
4 Implications of the Adjustment Cost Policy
Although these delay strategies and other methods the Bank used to slow down the ﬂow
of gold from its vaults might seem unconventional ways to conduct monetary policy,
they proved to be eﬀective strategies in managing the gold standard during the chaotic
34Acres (1931)Vol I p. 5.
35Acres (1931), Vol I p. 5.
36Acres (1931), Vol I, p. 98.
37Acres (1931) Vol I p. 116-117.
38Acres (1931) Vol I pp. 180-181. Clapham (1944) Vol I, pp. 233-234.
39Acres (1931) Vol I p. 107.
40Clapham (1944) Vol I, p. 236.
13years of the eighteenth century. The impact of the adjustment cost policy was not just
limited to the gold reserves of the Bank, but had an eﬀect on the general price level
and consumption.
As a starting point for a formal analysis I take Goodfriend’s (1988) model on asset
prices under the Classical Gold Standard. The economy has one perishable consumption
good and one durable consumption good, gold. Only gold can be stored across the
periods and therefore it has also the role of a capital good. Gold yields direct utility to
its holder and enters into the household’s utility function. The central bank buys gold
from abroad and monopolises the domestic gold trade. The objective of the central bank
is to stabilise consumption and the price level, and reduce variability of gold reserves.
The monetary price of gold, the price the household has to pay at the central bank,
is always ﬁxed at ¯ q. Buying gold from the bank is associated with an adjustment cost41
which can take the form of forgone leisure or we can think that the consumption good
gets destroyed at a convex rate while the agent waits on the bank. The total cost of
buying "new" gold from the central bank, qt (Kt − Kt−1), is the sum of the monetary
price of gold and the convex adjustment cost,







where ¯ q denotes the ﬁxed money price of the gold, Kt is the household’s gold stock in
period t, Km
t−1 is monetary gold stock in period t−1, parameter θ deﬁnes the steepness
of cost curve, 0 < θ ≤ 1. The adjustment cost is an increasing function of gold demand
(Kt − Kt−1) in period t and a decreasing function of the monetary gold stock Km
t−1 in
period t−1. The larger the stock of gold in the central bank’s vaults, the more willing
the bank is to sell out gold.
The circulating money stock, denominated in nominal units such as pounds, repre-
sents a liability of the central bank and takes the physical form of a paper claim rather
than a commodity. Binding law requires the central bank to be prepared to buy or
sell any amount of gold oﬀered or demanded in exchange for paper money at the ﬁxed
41This part of the model, an adjustment cost on durable goods, is inspired by Bernanke (1982).






where ηt ∈ (0,1] is the gold reserve ratio. If ηt = 1, the paper notes represent warehouse
certiﬁcates on gold and no ﬁduciary money circulates. The eighteenth century gold
standard was, however, a partial gold standard, under which the circulating paper
claims exceed the amount of backing commodity.42
If (2) is used to replace the central bank’s gold stockpile in (1), the total cost of
gold purchases becomes
qt (Kt − Kt−1) = ¯ q
￿







The higher the circulating money stock, the lower the adjustment cost of gold purchases.
In this Lucasian economy agents are households with two specialised individuals,
a producer and a shopper. The discussion is restricted to a representative household.
The shopper enters period t with predetermined holdings Mt−1 of money, which the
producer had gained during the previous period. Like in the Lucas’s tree model the
household does not consume its own production directly, but has to sell it in markets
for money. With this money the shopper buys the consumption good and gold in
the following period.43 In period t the shopper has an opportunity to purchase the
consumption good at price Pt, gold at ﬁxed monetary price ¯ q and government bonds
that yield a risk free interest rate Rt. By assuming that the adjustment cost reduces
















where Kt denotes the household’s gold stock and Ct the household’s consumption. The
cash-in-advance constraint states that gold and consumption purchases in period t are
limited by the cash holdings and the adjustment cost at the beginning of period t.
42This version for convertible currency is taken from Barro (1979), but was ﬁrst described by David
Ricardo in 1821.
43Sargent (1987)pp. 156-159.
15Government bonds are not subject of cash-in-advance constraint, as we assume that
gold deposits can be converted to bonds directly. The cash-in-advance constraint puts
an emphasis on the fact that here I model a commodity standard, where money is
used in exchange rather than a commodity money system.44 To date the gold standard
and other commodity standards have been modelled assuming that either specie or
redeemable notes alongside with coins are used as a medium of exchange. This paper,
however, makes a departure from the prevailing literature by considering an economy
where only paper money circulates and gold operates purely as a backing commodity
if held by the central bank or as a durable good if held by the household. Commodity
money systems have been analysed recently by Barro (1979), Sargent and Wallace
(1983), Goodfriend (1988) and Bordo, Dittmar and Gavin (2003).
An inﬁnitely lived household’s preferences are described by the utility function. The






t [u(Ct) + w(Kt)], (5)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and E is an expectation conditional on informa-
tion up to and including time period t.
By choosing sequences for Ct, Bt+1, Mt and Kt the household maximises (5) subject





















for all t, (6)
where the endowment Yt is an exogenous state variable, the government bonds are
denoted by Bt and the price of the bonds is deﬁned as the inverse of the interest rate
1/Rt ∈ (0,1]. Initial conditions M0, K0, and B0 and ¯ q is given. The Lagrangian for the














































(Kt − Kt−1) − Ct
￿
.
The ﬁrst order conditions necessary for the optimality of the household’s choices are
Ct : u


























Kt : 0 = u














































(Kt − Kt−1) − Ct
￿
≥ 0, µt ≥ 0. (12)
Combining (7), (8) and (9) and rearranging we get that
µt = u
￿ (Ct)[Rt−1 − 1]
￿








The multiplier µt, the shadow value of liquidity services of money, has to be non-
negative in order for the cash-in-advance constraint to be binding. As Rt−1 ≥ 1 the
second term of this equation is positive. The third term, the adjustment cost term, is
positive since







If the adjustment cost term equals unity, µt equals the marginal utility of consumption.
17Combining (7) and (8) gives the Euler equation












1 − [Rt−1 − 1]
￿
















1 − [Rt − 1]
￿




















g (Rt−1,Kt) = 1 − [Rt−1 − 1]
￿









g (Rt,Kt+1) = 1 − [Rt − 1]
￿













t−1 ≤ 1, the function g (·) decreases, when the gold





t approaches one, g (Rt,Kt+1) approaches
zero.
With these preliminary solutions in hand we are now able to study the eﬀect of
the adjustment cost on consumption, especially the link between the adjustment cost
and the variance of consumption.45 The functional form of (5) and preferences follow
Goodfriend (1988): In (5) the functional form of the utility of consumption is
u(Ct) = vt logCt (21)
where vt = v (1 + νt) > 0 and gold
w(Kt) = wt logKt (22)
45This part of the model is inspired by Hansen and Singelton (1983).


















ct+1 = Ct+1/Ct, (24)
denote the gross growth rate of consumption,
xt+1 = (vt+1/vt)(Pt+1/Pt)





I have to assume that the joint distribution of ct+1 and xt+1 is lognormal which might,
in the presence of adjustment costs, seem simplistic. However, as I here analyse the
variance of perishable good consumption, not gold demand, this simpliﬁcation seems
acceptable.46






Next let ˆ ct+1 = logct+1, ˆ xt+1 = logxt+1 and ˆ ut+1 = logut+1. The distribution of ˆ u
is log normal, with constant variance vart (u) and mean µu,t. Therefore, the expected
value of ut+1 is
Et (ut+1) = exp
￿
µu,t + (vart (u)/2)
￿
(28)
Equating (27) and (28) and solving for µu,t yields
µu,t = −logβRt − (vart (u)/2). (29)
The diﬀerence between ˆ ut+1 and its mean µu,t is
V = ˆ ut+1 − µu,t (30)
46Hansen and Singelton (1983), p. 252 list some ristrictions that are caused by the joint distribution
asumption (for example for production technology), but they are not relevant in our model.
19thus the expected value of V equals zero.
E (V ) = Et
￿
ˆ ut+1 − µu,t
￿
= Et [ˆ xt+1 − ˆ ct+1 + logβRt + vart (u)/2] = 0 (31)
where ˆ ut+1 = ˆ xt+1 − ˆ ct+1 + logβRt. This implies that
E (ˆ ct+1) = Et [ˆ xt+1 + logβRt − vart (u)/2]. (32)
In order to analyse the variance of ˆ ct+1 we can ignore the constant termand (vart (u)/2).
The predictable terms — variances of ˆ xt+1 and ˆ ct+1 — are related by the expression

















As noted above the function g (Rt,Kt+1) is a decreasing function of the demand
for new gold (Kt+1 − Kt). Therefore, if the gold demand increases the adjustment cost
stabilises consumption by reducing the variance of the expected consumption growth
rate var [E (ˆ ct+1)]. The higher the adjustment cost for gold, the lower the expected
variance of the consumption growth rate.
How does the adjustment cost together with the central bank’s gold stock pile policy
aﬀect the price level? In order to solve for the price path I combine the ﬁrst order





[1 − g (Rt−1,Kt)]















































































































In order to include the central bank’s response to temporary disturbances to gold
supply conditions into the model, a central bank’s gold stockpiling policy, which varies
stochastically according to the gold supply conditions abroad, is introduced. The central
bank’s stock piling policy rule follows Goodfriend (1988) and is written in terms of its





where φ ∼ N (0,σ2) and φt ∈ [−1,1]. If a positive gold stockpile shock increases the
gold stock of the central bank, φt > 0, the gold backing η from (2) rises which through
(4) indicates that the adjustment cost reduces.
Next we substitute (41), (21) and (22) to (40) and take expectations.47 By using



























where 1/Pt is the consumption price of currency in period t, i.e. inverse of the price
level.
47See Appendix 1 for details.
21With the adjustment cost policy the central bank is able to pursue price level
smoothing: If the gold demand increases, the function
￿






decreases which implies that the price level decreases. Also, increase in the preference
for gold wt decreases the price level. On the other hand, positive covariance between
the gold preference w and gold stockpile policy φ drives up the price level. If the
household’s gold demand is correlated with the gold supply conditions, i.e. there is a
simultaneous gold inﬂow to the country and an increase in gold preference, the price
level rises.
During the Classical Gold Standard the automatic adjustment mechanism reduced
the outﬂow of monetary gold and reduced the arbitrage proﬁt opportunities. This
mechanism did not function in the eighteenth century, because the Bank of England
was not fully in charge of the money supply and regular wars disturbed gold supply
conditions. The adjustment cost on gold purchases had, however, similar eﬀects on the
economy. If there were an exogenous gold preference shock, the adjustment cost reduced
the price level that made gold relatively more expensive. Without the adjustment
cost the potential variability in consumption would have been larger: a positive gold
preference shock would have increased household’s gold purchases and through the cash-
in-advance constraint less money would have been available for consumption purchases.
If both gold and consumption yield utility to household, why would the central bank
want to discourage gold consumption? The answer lies in the fact that the central bank’s
objective here is to stabilise the economy. Gold consumption reduces the circulating
money stock, which through the cash-in-advance constraint, reduces consumption and
the market activity. Gold preference shocks make the economy less stable: as only a
small percentage of the country’s money supply was backed by monetary gold, it was
important that the public preferred to hold paper and the gold preference shocks could
have been controlled.
225 Conclusions
After the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 the gold convertibility rule
evolved as a core monetary rule. Two key factors challenged the feasibility of this
rule: ﬁrstly, the Bank did not have a monopoly to issue paper money, and secondly,
an external shock would increase the market price of gold above its mint price, which
would give the public an opportunity to earn arbitrage proﬁts. The main purpose of
this paper was to analyse how the Bank of England might have been able to manage the
gold convertibility rule despite these challenges with a simple adjustment cost policy,
which increased the total cost of gold purchases. Furthermore, with the adjustment cost
the central bank could manipulate the price level, stabilise consumption and encourage
consumption instead of gold consumption.
In this paper we have addressed monetary policy during the Pre-classical Gold
Standard, which provides a starting point for the analysis of the Suspension Period.
Therefore, one could ask why the adjustment cost policy failed in 1797 when the Bank
had to suspend the gold convertibility rule for 24 years. Firstly, until the end of the
century the stable system of gold import and minting played a crucial role in monetary
stability in England, but in the early 1790’s there were large gold supply shocks: the
Brazilian mines, which were the main source of new gold, started to dry up and the
market price of Brazilian gold increased. The war that broke out in 1793 caused distur-
bances on the sea and increased the insurance costs of shipping.48 After the assignants
had failed, France tried to get back to the gold standard and in 1795 the demand bul-
lion in Paris was so high that the guineas bought at the mint price of £3. 17s. 101
2d.
per ounce from the Bank of England could be sold £4. 3s. 0d per ounce in Paris.
The Bank tried to improve the exchange rate in February 1796 by shipping silver to
Hamburg and buying Brazilian gold from Lisbon, but as the market price of gold bars
were now much higher than the mint price, coinage was unproﬁtable and in the end,
gold was sold as bars before the Bank had a chance to mint them. Finally, the war
against revolutionary France and the direct ﬁnancial support for British allies increased
48Vilar (1976) p. 227.
23the government’s demand for credit and specie. The adjustment mechanism failed as
it could not stop the drain of specie that was not caused by the general public but by
the government.
In the light of this model the Suspension Period could be seen, however, as an
extreme adjustment cost, a long slow down in gold convertibility. The suspension was
never perfect in the sense that the Bank kept converting those notes it wanted to
withdraw from circulation, such as old bank notes, that were easy to counterfeit. The
Bank also paid its dividends in gold and even increased them form 7.5 percent to 10.5
in 1807. The Suspension Period raises complex modlling issues, which are addressed in
Newby (2007).
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